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Abstract
Interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of action in the last few decades has tended 
toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of 
setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by the 
revival of anti-intellectualism (particularly from J. Moss’ work), according 
to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. In this essay 
I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of 
Aristotle’s theory, and propose an intermediate account, which I call indirect 
intellectualism, that preserves the merits of both traditional interpretations 
and is able to dispel the problems that trouble each. There is very strong 
textual evidence for the claim that goal-setting is the task not of reason but 
of character (and in this anti-intellectualists are right); but reason is able 
to set goals indirectly by carefully shaping the processes of habituation 
that constitute a person’s character (and in this intellectualists are right). 
I argue for this position through a study of the division of labour between 
character and reason, and through a reconstruction of Aristotle’s conception 
of habituation.
Keywords: action; control; habit; reason; care.
Racionalidad práctica, hábito y cuidado en Aristóteles
Resumen
En las últimas décadas, la interpretación de la teoría de la acción de Aristóteles 
ha tendido hacia una postura intelectualista, según la cual la razón está a 
cargo de establecer los fines de las acciones. Un resurgimiento del anti-
intelectualismo, según el cual establecer los fines es tarea del carácter y no de 
la razón, ha puesto esta postura bajo crítica (particularmente de la mano de J. 
Moss). Este ensayo sostiene que ninguna de las dos interpretaciones puede dar 
cuenta suficiente de las complejidades de la teoría de Aristóteles, y propone 
una postura intermedia, que llamo intelectualismo indirecto, que preserva 
los méritos de ambas interpretaciones tradicionales y a la vez logra disipar 
los problemas que aquejan a cada una. Existe muy sólida evidencia textual a 
favor de la tesis según la cual establecer fines es tarea no de la razón sino del 
carácter (y en esto los anti-intelectualistas están en lo correcto); pero también 
es necesario reconocer que la razón puede establecer fines indirectamente, a 
través del cuidado de los procesos de habituación que constituyen el carácter 
de una persona (y en esto los intelectualistas están en lo cierto). Defiendo 
esta interpretación a través de un estudio de los pasajes que señalan una 
división del trabajo entre el carácter y la razón, y de una reconstrucción de 
la concepción aristotélica de la habituación.
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PRACTICAL REASON, HABIT, 
AND CARE IN ARISTOTLE1
Juan Pablo Bermúdez
Universidad Externado de Colombia 
University of Toronto
For me, running is both exercise and a metaphor. 
Running day after day, piling up the races, bit by bit 
I raise the bar, and by clearing each level I elevate 
myself. At least that’s why I’ve put in the effort day 
after day: to raise my own level. I’m no great runner, 
by any means. […] But that’s not the point. The point 
is whether or not I improved over yesterday. In long-
distance running the only opponent you have to beat 
is yourself, the way you used to be.
—H. Murakami: What I talk about when I talk about 
running
Introduction: the problem of goal control
In everyday life we usually assume that we are agents, i.e. that we are 
autonomous beings who not only react, like rocks or H2O molecules, but act 
and can somehow determine their own fate. But this assumption becomes 
quite confusing once carefully examined. To begin, consider the definitional 
issues: what is an action?, and what makes beings like us agents? It has 
1 For their comments, which helped greatly improve this paper, I would like to thank Brad 
Inwood, Laura Liliana Gómez, Mark Kingwell, Klaus Corcilius, Ricardo Salles, Juan Piñeros, 
and the great audiences at the University of Toronto’s Philosophy Department, the Ágora 
Research Workshop, the II Canadian Colloquium for Ancient Philosophy, and the II UNAM-
Univalle conference. The responsibility is mine for the paper’s remaining shortcomings.
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recently been suggested that we can call ourselves ‘agents’ insofar as we 
control our behaviour, and that an agent’s behaviour counts as an ‘action’ 
only if the agent was in control of its production.2 Control-based accounts of 
intentional action are not new, however. Arguably, Aristotle already endorsed 
a version of it. He does, in fact, claim that we are in control (or kurioi) of our 
actions.3 Since the control-based accounts are experiencing a resurgence, it 
is now worth asking how Aristotle conceived of practical control. 
In Aristotle’s conception of basic, animal agency,4 actions are understood 
as locomotions that originate in the animal’s inner principles; those inner 
principles are (1) the animal’s faculties of cognition, desire, and motion; and 
(2) the animal’s natural dispositions to perceive some things as pleasant and 
others as painful (see Fig. 1.1). Animals have different cognitive capacities, 
which include different perceptual senses and diverse capacities of phantasia 
(roughly, a capacity to imagine previously perceived objects even when 
they are not perceptually present).5 They also have different capacities for 
desire (some can desire only immediate satisfactions; others can desire more 
distant and complex objects). These cognitive and volitional capacities put 
together constitute a functional unit—which Aristotle calls the “faculty of 
desire”—that allows the animal to pursue the good and flee from the bad. 
Thus, when the animal’s natural dispositions makes something appear good 
or bad, the animal appropriately pursues or flees from it.
In this model, animal action has one great limitation: the animal is 
said to act insofar as it controls the behaviour it produces in response to 
an appearance of some object as pleasant or painful; but it cannot control 
what appears pleasant or painful to it. This is largely established by nature:
One half of [animal] life consists in the activities of procreation, and the 
other in the activities related to nutrition; for all their efforts and their way 
2 See e.g. Pacherie (2008; 2011); Wu (2011; 2015); Shepherd (2014).
3 The word ‘kurios’ comes from the political context, meaning ‘master’ or ‘lord’; Aristotle 
gives its significance an abstract turn as ‘commander’ or ‘controller’. (See e.g. Eudemian 
Ethics [EE] II.6 1223a4--9.)
4 The canonical passages on animal agency are De Anima [DA] III.7--11 and De Motu 
Animalium [MA] 6-11. I offer a short sketch of this issue here, and discuss it further in my 
(Forthcoming).
5 The notion of ‘phantasia’ presents many interpretative complexities. I rely here on 
the widely shared view that one of its functions is allowing animals (humans included) to 
experience previously perceived objects while they are not perceptually present to them. 
Phantasia therefore entails some kind of perceptual memory, and some level of mental-
modelling capacities that are useful, e.g., in imagining the attainment of a goal that is not 
yet achieved. (For more detailed discussion see Nussbaum (1978, essay 5), Frede (1992), 
Labarrière (1997), Moss (2012, Chapter 3), and Carbonell (2013).)
80
Pr
a
c
ti
c
a
l 
r
ea
so
n
, h
a
b
it
, a
n
d
 c
a
r
e 
in
 a
r
is
to
tl
e
of life happens to revolve around these two. […] And what is in accordance 
with nature is pleasant; and each animal pursues that which is pleasant in 
accordance with nature (History of Animals [HA] VIII.1 589a2–9)
The apparently pleasant object is the animal’s goal, i.e. that for the 
sake of which it moves. So animals are not in control of their goals. What 
about humans, then? Are we in control of our goals, and if so, how do we 
establish them? Interpreters have answered this question it two main ways. 
Intellectualists hold that human agents establish their goals by means of 
reason [logos] and reasoning [logismos]; whereas anti-intellectualists claim 
that the goals of a human’s life are established by her character, and reasoning 
has no role in the goal-setting process.6
Figure 1.1: The structure of animal agency. (The inner principles  
of animal action are in bold font.)
I argue in what follows that neither of the two views manages to account 
for Aristotle’s particular take on goal control. Against intellectualism, there 
is plenty of textual evidence that shows logos cannot establish the goals of 
action; and against anti-intellectualism, if reason had nothing to do with 
goal-setting, then why would Aristotle have written ethical treatises, which 
are a long rational discussion on the goals of life? Given that both traditional 
positions are untenable, I defend the view I call indirect intellectualism. The 
two main claims of indirect intellectualism are the following: 
i. Reason can determine the goals of action only indirectly, by caring 
for the agent’s character.
ii.  An individual agent’s ability to care for her own character depends 
on political institutions of public care.
iii. Since the problem with traditional intellectualism is that it assumes 
reason can set an individual’s goals directly, by reasoning alone, I 
argue that reason sets goals only through habituation, the character-
6 For some intellectualist accounts, see Irwin (1975); McDowell (1998); Grönroos (2015); 
Hämäläinen (2015). Intellectualism has been the dominant view in recent years, but Moss 
(2012) has made a strong case for anti-intellectualism.
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shaping process. And Aristotle further claims that care for character 
development should be a mainly political task, so I argue that 
individual reason depends on public structures of public rationality. 
I proceed as follows: The first section briefly presents the evidence 
against the traditional intellectualist view; the second section argues for 
thesis (i) of indirect intellectualism. Given limitations of space, I must leave 
thesis (ii) for another occasion.
Reason cannot set the agent’s goals
In this section I (1.1) distinguish the functions that intellectualists 
attribute to practical reason, and then argue that (1.2) character, and not 
practical reason, establishes the goals of action. This view is strengthened 
by (1.3) Aristotle’s explicit claims on the issue of goal-setting.7
1.1. The functions of practical reason
Any account of the role of reason in action production must take to two 
striking features of Aristotle’s psychology under account: first, he divides 
the human soul into non-rational and rational parts, the former associated 
with character and capacities we share with animals, the latter allowing for 
calculation- and deliberation-dependent activities and dispositions (e.g. EN 
I.13). And second, he claims that the irrational part determines the goals of 
action, whereas reason is in charge only of establishing “the things toward 
the goal”. The diverse views of practical reason’s function stem from the 
interpretation of the phrase “things toward the goal”, which specifies reason’s 
realm of operation in action production. The most restrictive interpretation 
takes the phrase “things toward the goal” to be equivalent to “means”. In 
this reading, reason would have a purely instrumental function, and would 
therefore be unable to set goals.8 However, if “things towards the goal” is 
taken to include not just means, but also other things necessary for complex 
goal pursuit, other interpretive possibilities open up.
Specification intellectualism — An influential interpretation holds 
that the goals that character specifies are rather abstract (e.g. ‘the fine’ or 
‘the noble’), and thus reason must get involved to determine what counts 
7 I keep this, the negative part of the argument, at its bare minimum, to focus on the 
positive account. For more detailed criticism of the intellectualist and anti-intellectualist 
positions, see my (Forthcoming).
8 Such interpretation has been called ‘Humean’, since reason turns out to be little more 
than a ‘slave of the passions’, i.e. a mere assistant of non-rational goal-seting processes. This 
is a view not often supported, but often mentioned as a relevant dialectical opponent (cf. e.g. 
Irwin (1975); McDowell (1998a); Price (2011); Moss (2014)). 
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as attaining the goal in each practical situation (what counts as a fine and 
noble action in this particular context). Practical reason’s function is thus 
specificatory: deliberation establishes means to achieving the goal, but must 
previously determine the goal’s specific content.9
Coordination intellectualism — Another possible interpretation is 
that reason is in charge of assessing whether the currently active goal is in 
accordance with broader considerations. This may include assessing whether 
the goal fits with one’s overall conception of the good, or whether it is 
preferable to currently competing goals. If reason determines that a given 
end is not in accordance with one’s practical concerns, then it can reject it, 
and decide on a different path of action. This interpretation gives reason a 
coordination role, which allows the agent to lead a consistent and unified 
life, responsive to the broader goals that character purportedly establishes, 
mainly by evaluating each apparent good, and rejecting or postponing it 
whenever necessary. Thus, “the eligibility of a target in context is tested by 
deliberation”.10
Although interpreters argue about which of these interpretations of 
Aristotelian practical reason is correct, I need not choose between them 
here, for two reasons. The first is that they are not incompatible. In fact, 
a thorough intellectualist could attribute both goal-setting functions to 
reason, which would go something like this. In non-human animals, the 
appearance of an object as good or bad immediately generates a desire, 
and desire leads immediately and invariably to action; but in humans the 
capacities for rational calculation (logismos) and deliberation (boulē) stand 
in between desire and action (see Fig. 1.2), making it possible for the agent 
to exert more control by specifying what the good is in each occasion; by 
coordinating goals with one another; and by allowing the agent to not act 
even in the presence of an apparent good. 
Figure 1.2: The intellectualist interpretation of the structure of human agency.
9 Classical versions of this view include Wiggins (1975), Irwin (1975), and McDowell 
(1998).
10 Price (2011, 152–153), following Broadie (1991). See also Morales (2003, 86--88).
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1.2. The division of labour between reason and character
So intellectualists hold that reason determines the goals of action by 
specifying and coordinating them. But the two peculiarities of Aristotle’s 
moral psychology mentioned above (the distinction between the soul’s 
rational and non-rational parts, and the division of labour between them) 
suggest that reason cannot set the goals of action. Reason’s specification and 
coordination functions are but applications of deliberation and calculation, 
i.e. of logismos; but I show in what follows that several lines of textual 
evidence show that logismos cannot establish the goals of action: (1.2.1) 
we cannot arrive at practical reasoning’s starting points through reasoning; 
(1.2.2) deliberation is not about goals, but only about things toward the goals; 
and (1.2.3) goals are determined not by reasoning, but by habit and character.
1.2.1. There is no reasoning of “starting points”
Consider Aristotle’s claim that there is no logismos of the starting points 
of reasoning: 
Does virtue produce the goal (τὸν σκοπὸν), or the things toward the goal 
(τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν)? We posit that the goal, because there is no argument 
(συλλογισμὸς) or reasoning (λόγος) of it. Rather, it must be presupposed 
like a starting point. For neither does the doctor investigate whether to heal 
or not, but whether to take walks or not; nor does the athlete [investigate] 
whether to be in shape or not, but whether to wrestle or not. Likewise, 
no other [science] reasons about the goal; for just like in the theoretical 
[sciences] the hypotheses are starting points, equally also in the productive 
[sciences] the goal is a starting point and a hypothesis. […]
Thus, the starting point of thought (τῆς νοήσεως ἀρχὴ) is the goal, and the 
starting point of action is the end-point of thought. Therefore, if either vir-
tue or reason is the cause of all correctness, and reason is not the cause, then 
virtue will be the cause of the goal’s correctness, but not of the correctness 
of the things toward the goal. (EE II.11 1227b22–30 … 32–36)
The latter remarks fit nicely with the intellectualist view in the sense that 
reason is portrayed as standing between the goal and the action. However, 
such intermediary role also implies that reason is not in control of its own 
starting point, i.e. the goal. Just like axioms in geometry, practical reason 
must accept the goal as a hypothesis, and operate on those hypothetical 
grounds, because reasoning cannot produce its own starting point in the 
practical realm either.
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1.2.2. Deliberation is not about the goals
Which is why, as Aristotle goes on to argue, decision (prohairesis) is 
only about things toward the goal, but never about the goal itself.11 This is 
because decision is the product of deliberation,12 and deliberation itself can 
determine only the things toward the end, not the end itself:
We deliberate not about the goals but about the things toward the goals 
(τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη). For neither does the doctor deliberate whether to cure, 
nor does the orator whether to persuade, nor does the politician whether 
to make good laws, nor do people deliberate about the goal in the other 
cases; but having posited the goal they investigate the ‘how’ and the ‘throu-
gh what’ it will come to be (θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται 
σκοποῦσι). (EN III.3 1112b11–16)13
So there is no reasoning about the starting points of practical reasoning, 
i.e., the goals; and consequently deliberation, i.e. practical reasoning, is 
about the things toward the ends rather than about the ends themselves. 
Thus, whatever the “things toward the goals” are, the goals themselves are 
relevantly prior to them, determined by means other than reasoning. 
So how are goals determined, if not by reasoning?
1.2.3. Habituation determines the goals
First, as we have already seen, Aristotle mentions “virtue of character” 
rather than reason or thought as responsible for correctly establishing the 
starting points. We should see character, rather than virtue, as the crucial 
factor in goal-setting: although the virtuous character makes a person’s 
goals right, it is character, virtuous or not, that sets goals. So how is it that 
an agent’s character determines her goals?
A crucial part of the answer is Aristotle’s claim that virtue of character is 
about pleasures and pains.14 As seen above, an animal’s natural intuitions are 
given to it from birth and quite rigidly determine their practical perception 
(i.e. the tendencies for some things to appear pleasant and some things painful 
via their perception and phantasia). Contrastingly, human innate dispositions 
are much less definitive. This is not to say that our practical perception is 
11 ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα. [“Decision, however, is 
not of it {i.e. the goal}, but of the things that are for its sake.”] (1227b38–39; cf. EN III.2 
1111b26–29)
12 Cf. EN III.2 1112a13–17, III.3 1113a9–12.
13 More textual evidence for this view can be found in EN III.3 (1112b32--34) and EE 
II.10 (1226b10--12 & 1227a6--13).
14 The claim is repeated multiple times in EN II.3 and EE II.2–4.
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a blank slate: our initial natural dispositions are quite similar to those of 
other animals. But a crucial difference is that our practical perception can 
be largely re-shaped through habituation; so we find pleasure or pain in the 
things that we get used to finding pleasure or pain in.
It is worth clarifying that Aristotle does not consider animals to be 
devoid of all habituation capacities. His view is rather that “the other animals 
live mostly by nature, and some only few times by habits (τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα 
τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ δ’ ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν)” (Pol. 
VII.13 1332b3–4). We share these initial dispositions with animals, to the 
point that Aristotle claims the souls of children “do not differ at all, so to 
speak”, from the souls of animals (HA VII.1 588a32–b2), and is prepared 
to attribute phronēsis and other virtue-related terms to animals that display 
exceptional intellectual capacities.15 But he seems to think that animals by 
and large need not develop habits, probably because their natural dispositions 
provide them with sufficient cognitive adaptation to their environments.16 
Human innate dispositions, on the other hand, are quite deficient: we are born 
less hard-working and more pleasure-loving than we should be; and although 
we have innate predispositions toward acquiring virtue, such predispositions 
are actually dangerous without the proper cognitive development.17
This is why we need habituation processes that build our character 
and at the same time shape our appearances of the good, therefore broadly 
establishing our goals: which objects appear pleasant and worth pursuing, 
15 E.g. HA (488b15, 588a28–31, 611a16, 612a3, 612b1); On the Parts of Animals 
[PA] (648a6-11, 650b19-20); On the Generation of Animals [GA] III.2 (753a11-14); EN 
(1141a26–28). How to precisely interpret Aristotle’s attribution of notions like phronēsis and 
sunesis to animals, and the relation between these animal traits and their human counterparts, 
is a matter of discussion. On which see Lennox (1999, 16–ff.) and López Gómez (2009). 
16 Animals who admit of a certain level of habituation include sheep (who can be habituated 
to act as leaders for their flock, taking them back to the barn at the shepherd’s call [HA VI.19 
573b25–27]); seals (who gradually habituate their young to spend time in the water [VI.12 
567a6]); and deer (who lead their young toward safe places to habituate them to take refuge 
[VIII.5 611a19–21]). Some aspects of animal habituation are worth noting. First, animals 
can be habituated by humans or by themselves, as the examples indicate. Second, animals 
who partake in learning and teaching are “those which partake in hearing, not only those who 
perceive the differences between sounds, but also between their significations” (HA VIII.1 
608a17–21). Their ability to grasp significations makes these animals able to be tamed by 
humans, and Aristotle thinks “tamed animals are better by nature than wild ones, and it is 
better for all of them to be ruled by a human; for that way they find their preservation” (Pol. 
I.5, 1254b10–13, cf. Prob. X.45 896a2–3). (This remark suggests that Aristotle did not spend 
much time in a circus or a factory farm, and that his animal-research practices probably were 
very humane.) For further discussion of animal rule by humans, and the differences between 
this and other types of rule, see Miller Jr. (2013).
17 On the former, see EE II.5 (1222a36–38); on the latter, see EN VI.13 (1144b1–17). 
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and which appear painful and avoidable. A proper habituation will lead to 
the correct starting points (i.e. an appearance of the good that coincides 
with what truly is good); any other habituation will lead to incorrect starting 
points (EN III.4). Thus the character we have developed turns out to establish 
the principles of our action: our cognitive reactions to the practical world.
Moreover, habituation not only establishes our goals by moulding our 
practical perception. It also determines in which situations, and to what 
extent, we are willing to use reasoning and attend to arguments. This reveals 
that for Aristotle the use of practical reason is not a trait all humans share, 
but one proper only to the humans that have been properly habituated.
Reason and teaching certainly do not have strength in everyone; rather, the 
listener’s soul must have been prepared with habits to be pleased and suffer 
finely, just like soil that is to nourish the seed. For he who lives in accor-
dance with passion would not listen to reason, and would turn away from 
it—he would not even understand it. And how could a man with such dis-
position change his persuasion? He does not seem to yield at all to reason, 
but to force. So it is necessary that a character pre-exists that is somewhat 
familiar to virtue, that loves the fine and is displeased by the ugly. (EN X.9 
1179b23–31; cf. Topics [Top.] I.11 105a2–7)
Thus, character determines not only which things one loves and hates, 
but also whether one is capable of listening to the voice of reason. Aristotle 
refers to this also to argue that not everyone can be a good student of politics: 
immature people, who live by their passions, lack the experience that is 
necessary to turn reasoning into action.18
In sum, there are at least three strong lines of evidence suggesting that 
reason cannot set a person’s goals: the starting points of practical reasoning 
cannot themselves be obtained by reasoning; practical reasoning (i.e. 
deliberation) is not about the goals, but only about the things toward the 
goals; and our phantasiai of the good are set by the habituation processes that 
constitute our character. Moreover, as I will show now, Aristotle’s explicit 
claims on the issue make it even clearer that reason does not set goals.
1.3. Aristotle’s solution to the problem of goal control
During his Nicomachean discussion of action (EN III.5), Aristotle 
addresses an opponent who contends that while virtuous people are 
18 EN I.3 1095a2–10, I.4 1095b4–9.
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voluntarily virtuous, no one is voluntarily vicious.19 The beginning of this 
intricate passage makes it clear that there is a lot at stake in the issue: if 
it cannot be demonstrated that vice is voluntary, “we should not say that 
man is a principle or that he is the generator of his actions” (1113b17–19). 
In other words, unless it can be shown that virtuous people are voluntarily 
virtuous and vicious people are voluntarily vicious, the very claim that we 
are in control of our actions is falsified. Aristotle is probably led to making 
such claim given the tight causal connection between actions and character: 
a certain character begets actions of a certain kind (1114a11–18), and the 
principles of our actions, i.e. the appearances of the good, are determined 
by character (1113a30–31).20 Aristotle presents the opponent’s argument:
Now, if someone said that everyone pursues the apparent good, and we are 
not in control of phantasia but rather the end will appear to each one in ac-
cordance with the sort of person that he is, […]21 no one would be respon-
sible (αἴτιος) for his own bad actions, but rather each one would do what he 
does due to ignorance of the goal, believing because of it that what he does 
is the best for himself. And the aim for the goal would not be self-chosen 
(ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος); instead, one would need to have 
been born with a natural sense of sight that allowed one to discern finely 
and choose what is truly good. And he who has this sense in a fine condi-
tion by birth is a good-natured man. (EN III.5 1114a31–b5)
Taking ‘φαντασία’ and ‘φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν’ in the technical sense (i.e. 
as referring, respectively, to the faculty of phantasia, and to the appearance 
of the good that such faculty generates), the objection can be reconstructed 
as follows: 
19 The text provides no explicit identification, but there seems to be a consensus among 
scholars that this opponent is a Socratic who takes Socrates’ no-one-does-wrong-willingly 
doctrine and derives from it that vice is not voluntary, although virtue and happiness are. (It 
has even been suggested that it represents Socrates himself (Boeri 2008, 10).) The opponent’s 
claim, however, is expressed in a poetic style (οὐδεῖς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ’ ἄκων μακάριος 
(EN III.5 1113b14–15)) that resonates with the work of Epicharmus, an author who predates 
Socrates (cf. Gauthier & Jolif (1970, 213); Irwin (1999, 208); Broadie & Rowe (2002, 321)).
20  Some interpreters have claimed that this circular causal relationship between actions 
and character makes Aristotle’s position paradoxical. (Take Morales (2003), who argues that 
since actions depend on character and character on actions, we are not in control of each 
particular action we perform, and therefore concludes---against the evidence mentioned 
above---that deliberation must be able to go against character-defined goals.) As I will argue 
below, Aristotle’s position does seem to be circular, but in an virtuous way.
21  Aristotle’s own reply appears in the middle of this phrase, interrupting the 
opponent’s argument. I bracket it for a moment in order to present the opponent’s argument 
in full.
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i. Our phantasia of the good is determined by the sort of person that 
we happen to be.
ii. It is not up to us to be the sort of person we happen to be.
iii. Therefore, our phantasia of the good is not up to us. [I, II]
iv. So if someone has the wrong phantasia, she will act badly, and not 
voluntarily. [III]
v. Therefore, no one is voluntarily vicious. [IV]22
The opponent’s position has an interesting positive flipside: because 
we are the kind of person that we (naturally) turn out to be, our phantasia 
of the good is not up to us, but up to nature. So if we end up performing 
wrong actions, it is because we have the wrong phantasia, and this in turn 
is due to our being bad-natured. On the other hand, those who have the 
correct phantasia are in a way naturally blessed, born with a special sense 
of practical perception that provides them with the right discernment. For 
the rest of us, we can at least rest content in that our errors are not up to 
us, but rather caused by an unavoidable natural imperfection: we were just 
born that way!23
Aristotle could reply to the objection by rejecting either (I) or (II). If 
he held an intellectualist view, one would expect that he replied either of 
these claims: 
(I*) Our phantasia of the good is determined by reason. 
(II*) We can determine the kind of person we are through the exercise 
of reason. 
22 The argument seems to rely on two uncontroversial implicit premises. IV can be inferred 
from III and the implicit Aristotelian thesis that people act pursuing what appears good to 
them (e.g. EN III.4). In turn, V can be inferred from IV and the Aristotelian claim that a 
person’s character stems from the kinds of actions she repeatedly performs (e.g. EN II.1).
23 This naturalistic account of goodness appears elsewhere in Aristotle’s texts. The (rather 
puzzling) EE VIII.2 is dedicated to examining the possibility that some people may turn out 
to aim correctly at the goal, and achieve it, out of pure luck. He argues that fortunate people 
(i.e. those who do well in life without ever really knowing what they are doing) cannot 
actually achieve the goal of life out of fortune [tuchē], because luck cannot produce the 
same result consistently. So fortunate people are successful not due to their good luck, but 
because of their good nature. The argument goes on to say that the cause of someone’s good 
nature must be a sort of divine principle, which bypasses and surpasses reason, and even 
accounts for things like divination. Back in our passage, Aristotle seems to be dealing here 
with the radicalized version of the same naturalistic account of moral success. EN III.5 is 
much more critical of the naturalistic approach than EE VIII.2, however, perhaps because of 
an increased awareness that if we are not in control of our character we cannot be in control 
of our actions either. For if our phantasia of the good depends on our natural dispositions, 
how can we be in control of the actions it originates?
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But Aristotle replies to the objection by arguing neither for I* nor for 
II*: this passage contains no hint of the claim that logos or logismos can 
determine a person’s phantasia or character. In fact, no word related to 
reason appears anywhere in his reply. Aristotle does reply by rejecting (II), 
but in the way that an anti-intellectualist would expect:
Now, if someone said that everyone pursues the apparent good, and we are 
not in control of phantasia but rather the end will appear to each one in 
accordance with the sort of person that he is—actually, [we should reply 
that] if each one is in a sense the cause of his own character, he will also be 
in a sense the cause of his phantasia (εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς 
ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος). (1114a31–b3)
I translate the word aitios here as ‘cause’ to highlight the causal aspect 
of the claim, but it could also be translated as ‘responsible’ or ‘accountable’: 
you are accountable for your appearance of the good because, and insofar 
as, you are accountable for your own character [hexis].24
Action control depends on careful habituation
So we control our actions only insofar as we are causes of our phantasia 
of the good, and we are causes of our phantasia only insofar as we are causes 
of our character. But how are we causes of our character? In this section I 
answer this question by (2.1) exploring the mechanism of habituation, and 
(2.2) arguing that we can control our actions only insofar as we carefully 
shape our character through habituation.
2.1. How habituation works
The notion of habituation is deceptively simple: according to Aristotle, 
we become habituated into feeling pleasure and pain in relation to the 
right things simply by repeatedly performing the right actions (EN II.1). 
So habituation seems to be a merely mechanical process of repetition. If it 
is, then it seems unable to explain the generation of the complex cognitive 
capacities and dispositions of adult virtuous life (like good deliberation and 
phronēsis). Because the process of repetition-based habituation seems too 
mechanical to account for intellectual development, some scholars have 
added a conceptual or intellectual element to their description of habituation, 
24 Compare this link between phantasia and character [hexis] with the memorable claim 
from EN III.4: “The excellent person discerns each thing correctly, and what is true in each 
situation appears [phainetai] to him. For the fine and pleasant things are proper to each 
character [hexis]” (1113a29–31).
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which makes habituation consist not only in repeating certain tasks and 
developing certain dispositions, but also in dialectical training grounded on 
exhortation and advice. Habituation would thus yield correct beliefs about 
the fine and the noble, and an implicit conception of the human good, which 
can be made explicit by the study of ethics.25
I will argue that it is not necessary to intellectualize habituation in order 
to account for cognitive development. First, Aristotle’s discussions of habit 
and habituation do not explicitly mention intellectual or conceptual elements, 
but only repetitions of actions, so any addition of intellectual elements lacks 
textual support. Furthermore, if understood correctly, a non-intellectual 
account of habituation is sufficient to explain how we develop the proper 
intellectual capacities that ultimately lead to complex adult agency.
I construct an account of habituation by looking first at the relationship 
between habit and nature, and then at how exactly it is that mere repetition 
alters our phantasia of the good. I argue that (2.1.1) habit is an artificial 
inner causal principle that extends natural practical capacities; (2.1.2) and 
it achieves such extension because through repetition we become able to 
endure affections and activities that we are initially unable to endure. This 
account can explain how the proper habituation makes us able to engage 
in, and even enjoy, the effortful activities that ultimately lead to the virtues.
25 Cooper thinks Aristotle, though not “careful enough to say so”, does not conceive 
of habituation as “the purely mechanical thing it may at first glance seem”; what is not 
mechanical about it is that it “must involve also […] the training of the mind”, so that the 
trainee “comes gradually to understand what he is doing and why he is doing it”, i.e. “to see 
the point of the moral policies which he is being trained to follow, and does not follow them 
blindly” (1975, 8). Burnyeat, for his part, holds that the difference between only having the 
that and also having the because consists in “a contrast between knowing or believing that 
something is so and understanding why it is so”, and that the necessary starting points of 
practical reasoning are “correct ideas about what actions are noble and just” (1980, 71–72). 
In a similar vein, McDowell claims that “We travesty Aristotle’s picture of habituation into 
virtue of character if we suppose the products of habituation are motivational propensities 
that are independent of conceptual thought, like a trained animal’s behavioural dispositions. 
On the contrary, the topic of book 2 is surely initiation into a conceptual space […] organized 
by the concepts of the noble and the disgraceful […]. Possessing ‘the that’, those who have 
undergone this initiation are already beyond uncomprehending habit […]. They have a 
conceptual attainment that, just as such, primes them for the reflection that would be required 
for the transition to ‘the because’.” (1998a, 39–40). Likewise, Frede holds that “habituation 
concerning the virtues of character […] does not only consist in acquiring the disposition 
to be affected correctly in every particular situation, but also the disposition to choose the 
right action. And both involve a good deal of thought.” (2013, 23)
91
Ju
a
n
 P
a
b
lo
 b
er
m
ú
d
ez
2.1.1. Habit as an extension of nature
This is one of Aristotle’s descriptions of habituation:
Character (τὸ ἦθος), as its name indicates, is that which grows out of habit 
(ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν), and something is habituated when, after 
having been repeatedly moved in a certain way by non-innate training, it is 
eventually capable of being active in that way (ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς 
μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πώς, οὕτως ἤδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν). (EE 
II.2 1220a39-b3)
According to this, habits have a causal power: through repetition an 
agent becomes able to perform a non-natural pattern of activity without 
external enforcement. The principle that originally accounts for the agent’s 
activity is external to the agent, but through habituation said principle 
becomes internal. The activity thus quite literally becomes ‘second nature’: 
an artificial inner principle of movement.
Habits also have cognitive and motivational aspects, because habituation 
makes things appear pleasant or painful: “The things that are customary 
and acquired by habit are also among those that are pleasant—Aristotle 
says in the Rhetoric—; for many among the things that are not naturally 
pleasant produce pleasure when people have become habituated to them.”26 
The discussion of human sexual development exemplifies both causal and 
cognitive aspects of habit:
[The impulse of the young] towards sexual activities is strongest when they 
begin, so that if they do not take care to avoid causing further movement 
(beyond the changes that their bodies themselves make, even without se-
xual activity) it follows that they become habituated (εἴωθεν) in their later 
life. For the females who are sexually active while quite young become 
more intemperate, and so do the males if they are unguarded either in one 
direction or in both. For the channels become dilated and make an easy 
passage for fluids in this part of the body; and at the same time their old 
memory of the accompanying pleasure creates desire (ἡ τότε μνήμη τῆς 
συμβαινούσης ἡδονῆς ἐπιθυμίαν ποιεῖ) for the intercourse that then took 
place. (HA VII.1 581b11-21; cf. Pol. VII.16 1334b29–1335a35)
The passage makes clear that through repetitions of (both physical 
and mental) activity we generate habits that shape not only our bodies and 
their subsequent motions—the account tells of passages becoming dilated 
26 Rhet. I.10 1369b16–18. See also EN II.3 (1104b8–13), VII.10 (1152a30–33), and 
Corcilius (2013, 141–142).
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and fluids flowing more easily—, but also our cognitive and motivational 
dispositions, i.e. our tendencies to perceive and remember things as appealing 
or unappealing, and therefore to generate desires towards them. Thus, habit 
is an extension of nature because, by repeating activities of a certain kind, 
we create new patterns of practical cognition and motivation, which were 
not innately established (e.g. if we repeatedly engage in sexual intercourse, 
we subsequently desire sexual intercourse even more than was innately 
determined).
2.1.2. Repetition, endurance, and pleasure
How is it that mere repetition of actions can shape our cognitive and 
motivational dispositions toward feeling pleasure and pain? This is the core 
problem of habituation: repetition seems to be a purely mechanical process, 
so it is not clear what cognitive value it may have. How can we move from 
mechanical iteration to cognition and motivation? Luckily, Aristotle answers 
this question explicitly. 
The first step toward an answer is understanding the link between what 
is natural and what is pleasant. Recall that “what is in accordance with nature 
is pleasant” (HA VIII.1 589a2–9). Aristotle further develops this idea in the 
Rhetoric, where he makes a taxonomy of pleasant things. The list starts with 
natural things: “What for the most part leads toward what is according to 
nature is necessarily pleasant, and most of all whenever the beings that are 
according to nature recover their own nature”.27 But natural things do not 
exhaust the class of pleasant things. Aristotle adds two more items:
καὶ τὰ ἔθη (καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται· ὅμοιον γάρ 
τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει· ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τῷ ἀεί, ἔστιν δ’ ἡ μὲν φύσις 
τοῦ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλάκις), καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον (παρὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἡ βία, 
διὸ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν […]) 
Also habits [are necessarily pleasant], for what has been habituated 
already occurs just like what is natural, because habit is something similar 
to nature (ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει); in fact, what occurs repeatedly 
is akin to what occurs always, and while nature is among the things that 
occur always habit is among those that occur repeatedly. And what is not 
forced (τὸ μὴ βίαιον) [is necessarily pleasant], for what is forceful is against 
nature, which is why things that are necessary are painful […] (1370a5–10)
27 ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰέναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν 
ἀπειληφότα ᾖ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν γιγνόμενα[.] (Rhet. I.11 1369b33–1370a5)
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This passage confirms the nature-habit analogy, and builds an overall 
picture of the things that are pleasant, dividing them into three groups: what 
is natural (because it restores a natural state), what is habitual (because habit 
works in a way analogous to nature), and what is not forced (because what 
is forced is opposed to what is natural). The third group actually includes 
the other two, which entails that anything that is not against nature (i.e. 
forced) is pleasant.28
This is the first element required to answer our question (how can mere 
repetition alter cognitive dispositions?). The second element is that, although 
those things that are not against nature are pleasant, they are pleasant only 
to a degree. Eating and drinking, for instance, are pleasant until you are 
filled, and after a certain point those activities can become quite unpleasant. 
Similarly, we enjoy physical and cognitive activities (like walking or running, 
learning or contemplating) only until we get tired.29 
This is where repetition comes in: repeating the same activity multiple 
times increases our capacity to endure its performance, thereby making us 
able to enjoy its performance for longer periods. This is explicitly clear in 
Aristotle’s reply to one of the Problems concerning food, which is worth 
quoting in some length:
Why do the same things appear pleasant (ἡδέα φαίνεται) to those habitua-
ted [to them], but do not appear pleasant to those who take them in too con-
tinuously? (And ‘habit’ is doing something repeatedly and continuously.) 
Is it perhaps because habit produces in us a certain receptive disposition 
(ἕξιν δεκτικήν), but not satiety, whereas continuously consuming some-
thing satiates the appetite? For appetite also is something [like this]. Thus 
dispositions, when trained (γυμναζόμεναι), grow and increase; but vessels 
do not become larger by getting filled up. Hence habit, being an exercise 
(ὂν γυμνάσιον), increases the receptive disposition […].
Further, habit is pleasant not in the sense that it always is pleasant (for even 
these things [i.e. habitual things] are painful, if they are done continuous-
ly), but rather in the sense that we receive the begining of the activity with 
pleasure, and are able to do the same thing for a longer time than if we were 
not habituated (πλείω χρόνον δύνασθαι ταὐτὸν ποιεῖν ἢ ἀσυνήθεις ὄντας).
28 An animal moves by force (βίᾳ) whenever it moves or stays still against its own inner 
impulses, because of the influence of an external source of motion (EN III.1; EE II.7). We 
can imagine a hurricane lifting a cow and dragging her through the sky—whenever that 
happens, it happens by force—, or a cage impeding a bird’s flight—its stillness occurs by 
force, against the animal’s inner sources of motion. 
29 “How come, then, nobody is pleased continuously? Is it because they get tired? For it 
is impossible for anything human to be continuously active. So there cannot be [continuous] 
pleasure either; for pleasure follows the activity.” (EN X.4 1175a3–6)
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In that sense, then, things produce pain even though they are pleasant […]. 
The cause is that our own receptive and productive capacities are not unli-
mited, but limited; and when they come across something that is commen-
surate with them (one can indeed continuously and increasingly percei-
ve this), some of them get satiated, and the others are unable to function. 
(Prob. XXI.14 928b23-929a5)
Thus, given the limitations of our capacities for receiving affections and 
producing actions, we find pleasure in affections and activities only until 
these capacities are exhausted. But habit extends our natural capacities by 
increasing our receptive dispositions. By repeating an activity we exercise 
ourselves in its performance, we build up our endurance of this activity—
much like a runner builds up endurance while training for a marathon, or 
someone who regularly eats spicy food develops a resistance for spices. 
This ‘gymnastic’ aspect of habit is crucial for understanding its role in both 
moral and cognitive development.
Crucially, habit does not seem to make us enjoy things that we did not 
at all enjoy before—i.e. we cannot habituate ourselves into things that are 
forced and go against our inner principles of action. What habit does do is 
allow us to extend our natural pleasures by extending the amount we can 
receive of the pleasant thing before it becomes painful, or extending the 
amount of time we can perform an action before we get too tired and have 
to take a break. Virtuous life is like a long marathon, and proper habituation 
is like the daily training routine that builds the resistance needed to reach 
the end of the race without hitting a wall of exhaustion.
We initially have a tendency to avoid hard work, and to excessively 
enjoy easy and immediate pleasures. So proper habituation is necessary 
to develop the right moral and cognitive dispositions that originate virtue. 
This is because by exercising the correct rational activities, we become 
more able to endure them, and to enjoy them for longer periods. This is 
how non-intellectual habituation sufficiently explains moral and cognitive 
development.
2.2. Care for habits is necessary for agentive control
Back to the open question: EN III.5 claims that we are in control of our 
actions because we are (in a sense) the causes of our phantasia, and that we 
are causes of our phantasia because we are (in a sense) the causes of our 
character. So in what sense are we causes of our character? To find the answer, 
we must go back to the debate with the anonymous opponent in EN III.5.
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Immediately after introducing his opponent’s thesis (i.e. that no one 
is voluntarily vicious), Aristotle begins his refutation (1113b21–30) by 
claiming that everyday social practices presuppose that we are in control 
of our actions: we all praise and blame, reward and punish each other for 
actions we perform—all of which would make no sense if external principles 
determined our actions. He further adds that everyday legal practices 
show people being held responsible even for things they do in ignorance 
(1113b30–1114a3); e.g. if someone did something in ignorance because he 
was drunk, he gets twice the punishment. This practice—he thinks—reveals 
that those who seem to ignore things “due to lack of care (δι’ ἀμέλειαν)” are 
accountable for their actions, because not ignoring it was up to them; since 
“they were in control of caring (τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι).” 
Now that Aristotle has introduced the notion of care, the opponent 
strikes back, challenging the very idea that everybody is in control of caring, 
of being careful:
—“But perhaps he is the sort of person who would not be careful! (ἀλλ’ 
ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι)” (1114a3–4)
This remark, laconic as it is, makes a lot of sense: after all, being careful 
about things is a character disposition (a hexis), and the dispute is about 
whether we actually are in control of such character states. So Aristotle’s 
answer thus far seems to merely beg the question. But he retorts: 
—However, they are the causes of having come to be that sort of person, 
by living carelessly (ζῶντες ἀνειμένως). And they were the causes of being 
unjust, by doing bad actions, and of being intemperate, by having spent 
their time drinking etc. For each sort of activity produces the corresponding 
sort [of character disposition]. And that is made evident by those who care 
(τῶν μελετώντων) about any competition or practice (πρᾶξιν); because 
they accomplish this by being active. So you have to be absolutely insensi-
ble to ignore that performing actions generates the corresponding states of 
character (ἕξεις). (1114a3–10)
Aristotle goes on to expand on his conclusion by stating that, therefore, 
people who commit unjust acts are voluntarily unjust, and no one who acts 
badly can say that he is involuntarily unjust. So he takes it that by this point he 
has already won the argument. —But how? What was his winning argument?
To show that being virtuous or vicious is in our control, Aristotle 
adduces a crucial piece of evidence: the behaviour of athletes (“those who 
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care about some competition or practice”). Which is rather surprising, if not 
disappointing. He seems to assume that merely watching someone train for 
a competition reveals how control over character works. But, really, what 
does an athlete working out have to do with the voluntariness of vice?
On closer inspection, however, maybe all we need to know about habit 
and agency is before our eyes when looking at a training athlete. To achieve 
her best performance, she knows she must practice, i.e. carefully repeat 
the same sort of action over and over and over until she generates the right 
cognitive and bodily dispositions. Because she knows the right dispositions 
are generated by repeating the right kinds of actions, she takes control of her 
habits by carefully repeating the kinds of actions that will turn her into who 
she wants to be. So the athlete’s behaviour does reveal a secret of agentive 
control: we control our actions insofar as we carefully shape the habits that 
cause them. This is a variation on the theme found in the Problems passage 
discussed above: habituation is an exercise, a gumnastikon, through which we 
extend our naturally limited dispositions for receiving things and producing 
actions, thereby extending our control.
This dialectical passage is full of words related to care (ameleia, 
epimelethēnai, meletān, tōn meletōntōn), which highlights the main upshot: 
care for one’s character is a necessary condition for having control over 
one’s actions. Someone who ignores this (the dependency between actions 
and character states) would be “absolutely insensible”, i.e. would lack all 
understanding of the human condition. And there could clearly be people who 
lack this self-understanding: Aristotle would not hesitate to deny it to natural 
slaves, probably to women, and perhaps even to the majority of people, who 
go about their lives guided by their passions and do not care at all about the 
fine (EN X.9 1179b31–1180a14). The problem for those who do not care 
for the shape of their habits is that they end up stuck with severely limited 
dispositions for sensation and action, that make them cling excessively to 
immediate pleasure and flee from even little amounts of pain. So they never 
develop the ability to control their actions in demanding situations: they 
will go for the small instant gratifications, and miss out on the hard-earned 
satisfactions of a fulfilled life. From this perspective, then, agency (i.e. the 
control over one’s behaviour) does not belong to human beings qua such. 
Rather, it is an achievement that is attained by continuously elevating oneself 
beyond one’s past dispositions through habituation.
Remember the paper’s main question: Controlling our actions seems to 
imply controlling our goals; but how can human agents control their goals? 
Against traditional intellectualism, I have argued that we cannot establish 
goals directly by means of reasoning. Instead, character determines the 
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goals we pursue, by establishing which objects appear pleasant and which 
appear painful. However, reason could determine the phantasia of the good 
indirectly, by directing habituation toward developing certain character 
dispositions. This is the first thesis of the position I earlier called ‘indirect 
intellectualism’, namely, that logos can determine our goals indirectly, by 
carefully shaping our habits. Clearly, care for habits is a task that only reason 
can perform: it requires considering actions instrumentally as means to build 
a certain disposition, specifying which actions would better embody that 
goal, and performing long-term coordination; so all of reason’s functions 
are implied. That is one of the key reasons why anti-intellectualism does 
not sufficiently account for agentive control.
Having thus offered arguments against both traditional interpretations 
of Aristotle’s theory of action (intellectualism and anti-intellectualism), and 
having developed the foundations of an intermediate position based on the 
nature of habituation as the gymnastics of the soul, it is time to offer some 
conclusions. 
Conclusions 
3.1. The circular structure of human agency
Let us look back at the big picture for a moment. In response to his 
anonymous opponent, Aristotle claims that we are in control of our actions 
insofar as we cause our appearance of the good, and we are responsible for 
our appearance of the good insofar as we cause our character. In the previous 
section I attempted to explain how habituation causes character and accounts 
for the moral and intellectual development required to achieve virtue.
This enables us to understand how an agent can be the cause of her 
own character. A crucial part of the explanation turns out to be that human 
agency has a circular structure (see Fig. 1.3 [and contrast it with Fig. 1.2 
above]): repeated actions generate dispositions of character; character 
in turn determines practical cognition (i.e. the phantasia of the good); 
practical cognition activates desires toward the objects that appear good; and 
desire—mediated by reason’s specificatory, instrumental, and coordinating 
activities—shapes subsequent actions. These actions, in turn, generate 
dispositions of character. And so on.
This is a fundamental structural difference between human and animal 
agency, not previously analyzed in the interpretive literature. Animal action 
production is a linear causal process, whose starting point is the innate natural 
dispositions and whose end point is locomotion (cf. Fig. 1.1). In the case 
of non-human animals (and young children), nature innately specifies their 
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objects of desire through their innate phantasia of the good. So animals 
are in control of their motions insofar as the principles of those motions 
are internal to them; but they have no control over the principles of their 
action, because their phantasia of the good is largely hard-wired into them 
by innate natural tendencies. The only way for an agent to take control of 
the principle of her action (i.e. the first mover, the object of desire, which 
sets all other movers in motion) is by making the whole system bite its tail, 
so that actions are able to modify their own originating principles. A human 
agent can do this (i.e. modify her phantasia of the good) if she can shape 
her habits. It thus becomes possible for us to act in order to acquire a certain 
character, thereby shaping the way the practical world appears to us. 
Figure 1.3: The circular structure of human agency.
3.2. The two theses of indirect intellectualism
Given the analysis above, there are two main ways in which an 
individual’s rational control over her actions is notoriously indirect. Here 
is the first one:
Indirect intellectualism 1: Reason determines the goals of action via care-
ful shaping of character. 
This thesis has the advantage that it can accommodate the key insights 
from both traditional intellectualism and anti-intellectualism: it preserves 
the division of labour (it is character, not reason, that directly determines 
our phantasia of the good), but it also explains how the soul’s rational part 
can guide and rule over the non-rational part.
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The functions of reason discussed above (specificatory, instrumental, and 
coordinating) are necessary for individual agents to shape their habituation 
patterns. Just as an athlete training for a competition must rationally select 
appropriate actions, and coordinate them toward doing well at the time of 
the competition, the autonomous individual agent must rationally select the 
specific practices, and coordinate them through time toward the acquisition 
of the character she wants to build for herself. 
But how does she know what character she should build for herself in 
the first place? This is the terrain in which the anti-intellectualist is still right: 
the originary appearance of a certain character as good must necessarily 
precede all reasoning and deliberation about habit care. The first phantasia 
of the good is a consequence of the first steps of an individual’s habituation. 
And importantly, such steps did not depend on her, but were performed by 
those other people who cared for her. So rational control over actions is 
indirect in another way:
Indirect intellectualism 2: The reason of other people allows for an indivi-
dual to rationally control her own goals.
The social nature of individual agentive control is evident from these 
brief remarks: if we are in control of our actions because we are in control 
of our phantasia; and we are in control of our phantasia because we are in 
control of our habits. By transitivity, it follows that we are in control of our 
actions only insofar as we are in control of our habits. But more specifically, 
Aristotle claims that we are “in a way responsible” (πως αἴτιος) of our 
phantasia of the good and our habits (EN III.5 1114b2–3). This qualification 
is due, if nothing else, to the unavoidable fact that we must rely on other 
people for our initial habituation processes. So each individual agent’s 
character is initially in other people’s hands. How is this dependence on 
others compatible with individual autonomy and control? This is a large and 
complex topic, one that unites Aristotle’s ethical and political theories, and 
that deserves a careful treatment. I will provide such treatment in an essay 
that follows the path that this one has opened up.
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